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NATURE OF APPEAL
This

is

an

District

Court,

Summary

Judgment

appeal

from

Honorable
as

to

a decision of the Third Judicial

Raymond

all

Uno

causes

of

presiding,

granting

action in plaintiff's

Complaint.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
granting

Beehive

contends

that

the

Summary

Judgment

relating

District
to

the

Court
contract

erred in
for the

purchase of one million brick due to the existence of substantial
questions of

fact relating

to the existence of the contract, as

well as substantial questions of law

relating to

the compliance

with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
2.

Beehive complied

of Frauds in relation
Robinson

and,

as

with the

requirements of the Statute

to

its

distributorship

such,

the

District

arrangement with

Court erred in granting

Summary Judgment.
3.
as to

The District Court erred

Beehive's Third

Cause of

in granting
Action due

summary judgment

to the existence of

questions of fact regarding Robinson's attempts to interfere with
contracts of Beehive.
4.

Beehive conferred

serving as a distributor

substantial benefit upon Robinson by

at a

time when

Robinson had

no other

distributor in the Salt Lake area. Beehive accepted the temporary
distributorship with the understanding that they would be granted
a

permanent

distributorship

if they could adequately represent

the products

of Robinson.

Beehive should be fairly compensated

for the benefit which they conferred upon Robinson.

ARGUMENT I
SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW SHOULD
HAVE PRECLUDED THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RELATIVE TO THE ONE MILLION BRICK ORDER
In granting summary judgment, a court must establish whether
all material

facts are

uncontested.

facts are contested, the

court must

In the event that material
view the

facts in

most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

a light

Helgar Ranch v.

Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980).
In order to determine
established rules

whereby parties

for consideration.
the

Third

facts" supported

facts, the

Courts
judgment

requires
include

by references

courts have

may submit facts to the court

Rule 3(g) of the Local Rules of

District

support of summary

the relevant

that
a

each

statement

to the record.

Practice for
memorandum in
of "material

Rule 3(h) of the

Local Rules of Practice for the Third District Courts establishes
a similar requirement for the memorandum of opposing parties.
In its

opening brief, Beehive pointed out several instances

where Robinson failed
accurate citations

to

support

to the

In its Memorandum in

its

"undisputed

record (Appellant's

Support, Robinson

facts" with

Brief at 10-22).

claims facts

which were

not supported by the record (Record at 38-43) and, as such, these
facts should not have
District Court.

been considered

Robinson's

failure to
2

to be

uncontested by the

support its "undisputed

facts" with

proper citations is even more important in this case

because the District Court was
checking

the

citations

unable

submitted

"undisputed facts" submitted by
supported by

to

by

verify

the

Robinson.

Robinson in

facts by

Most of the

its Memorandum were

citations to depositions which were never published

and which were not

filed with

the court

until approximately 13

days after the Summary Judgment was granted.
Beehive's Memorandum

in Opposition to Summary Judgment also

raises several questions of fact relative to the issues of offer,
acceptance,
agreements

confirmation
of

the

and

parties

performance
(Record

at

of

the

63).

contractual

These

factual

differences are discussed in detail in Appellant's opening Brief.
Robinson does not, however,
of

fact.

questions

Instead
by

confirmation

Robinson

claiming
and

that

performance

address any

chooses

to

issues

of

are

of these questions

dismiss

the factual

offer, acceptance,

questions

of law, not fact.

Robinson seems to be practicing the old legal maxim:
When the law is against you, argue the facts
When the facts are against you, argue the law.
While

issues

such

performance do

as

offer,

acceptance,

involve substantial

cannot be viewed in a vacuum.

confirmation

issues of

They can only

and

law, these issues

be properly decided

when applied to the facts of the particular case.
Because

Robinson

discrepancies presented
Robinson conceeds

has

chosen

not

in Beehive's

to

argue

brief, it

the

is assumed that

that questions of fact did exist.

As such, no

further discussion will be presented in this reply brief.
3

factual

With regard

to the

issues of

law, Robinson

brief that in order for contracts

to be

be

(2)

(1)

an

oral

agreement

and

memorandum of the

oral

agreement

Robinson supports

this argument

Utah Code Annotated (1987).

enforceable, there must

a

writing

by citing

to three issues relevant to this argument.

parties.

Neither the

or confirming

(Respondent's

exist an

language of

Brief

at 10).

to Section 70A-2-201

Beehive draws the

201 does not require that there

states in its

court's attention

First, Section 70A-2oral agreement between

the statute nor the official

comments to Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial

Code require

the existence of an oral agreement.
Second,

even

if

we

assume

that

an

oral

required, Robinson has failed to indicate that an
was not

made.

agreement

oral agreement

Robinson asserts that the oral agreement was not

complete because this agreement

was

contingent

upon Robinson's

ability to make a brick of the right color and texture.
supports this
(Deposition of

statement with

a citation

Monte Jones).

in

pages

73-75

Appellant

which

indicate

conditioned upon Robinson's making the
lines 1-3
at least

to Record

Robinson

94 at 73-75

This citation to this record does

not support Robinson's claim.
place

is

is unable
that

right

the

color.

to find any
order

was

In fact,

of page 75 indicate that Robinson's employee knew that
some of

the order

would be

filled with substitutions

(Record 94 at p. 75).
Third,

the

alleged

conditional acceptance of Robinson was

not raised as the defense in Robinson's answer, nor was it raised
4

as

a

material

Accordingly,

fact

the

irrelevant for

in Robinson's Motion for Summary Judgment.

so-called

conditional

acceptance

issue

is

purposes of this review, and only serves to cloud

the issues presented on appeal.
Robinson's brief also states that all of the

test runs were

unsatisfactory (Respondent's Brief at 10). As noted in Beehive's
opening brief, Robinson's citation
this

claim

does

unsatisfactory.
desire for

not

indicate

to the

record in

support of

that the bricks were completely

It is undisputed that

both parties

expressed a

the brick to improve, if possible, but in general the

test runs were accepted and

used

by

Beehive

and

its customer

(Record 95 at 111-116) . Appellant finds it curious that Robinson
does not address this

issue in

its brief,

but chooses

only to

parrot this same misleading statement.
In addition, the issue of acceptance or rejection was raised
as

a

disputed

Opposition

question

to

Summary

of

fact

Judgment

in

Beehive

(Record

at

Memorandum

in

63) and, as such,

should have been resolved in Beehive's favor.
Robinson
confirmed in

further

contends

writing.

not

This contention

claim

memorandum.

that

the

oral agreement
is incorrect.

purchase

Robinson next

not

indicate

agreement

that

order

was

not

argues that Beehive

by sending

a purchase

Beehive has not and does
acts

as

a

confirming

asserts that the letter of April 17,

1986 cannot be construed to be
"does

the

Robinson mistakenly

intended to "confirm" the
order.

that

a

a confirming

memorandum since it

contract had been made between the
5

parties" and

that "the

color of bricks could
page 12).

Once

The letter

of April

different places

letter stated that the order for special

not be

fulfilled" (Respondent's

again, Robinson
17, 1986

that the

order had

Paragraph 5

could

produced,

not

be

substitutions

in

attempts to mislead the court.

(Addendum) states

would be filled.

color.

but

clearly in two

been received

indicates that

The

Brief at

that

next

and that it

the special color

Robinson

paragraph

would

allow

indicates that

Robinson would be willing to fulfill all existing orders and then
specifically listed

the

provincial

brick

antique

Emerson
as

Larkin

an

order

existing

of

one million

order.

This letter

certainly raises a question of fact as to whether or not an order
was

received

and

accepted

by

Robinson,

Robinson breached the agreement by failing

and

whether

to provide

or not

the brick

as promised.
Finally, Robinson
Section 70A-2-206.
under this

addresses Beehive's

In is opening

argument relative to

brief, Beehive

contended that

section of the code, a merchant could be held to have

accepted an offer
conforming or

if

he

either

shipped

nonconforming goods.

or

Assuming

promised

for a moment that

Beehive has not complied with the requirements of
Frauds, this

rule constitutes

upon performance.
goods by

its terms

to ship

the Statute of

an exception to the statute based

The shipments of goods or the promise
suggests the

existence of

to ship

a contract since

people rarely ship goods without having a commercial reason to do
so.

Robinson either misunderstands or ignores Section 70A-2-206
6

by

contending

other

code

that

the

provisions.

substantiation or

This

authority.

2-201 of the Uniform
claim that

statute

of frauds is not qualified by

argument

is

The official

Commercial Code

made

without any

comments to Section

do not

support Robinson's

the Statute of Frauds operates independently of other

sections of the Code.

On the other

hand, the

official comments

to Section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code indicate just the
opposite by stating:
"The beginning of performance by an offeree
can be effective as acceptance so as to bind
the offeror
only if
followed within a
reasonable time by notice to the offeror."
It stands

to reason

capable of binding

that if
an

performance constitutes a contract

offeror,

it

certainly

should

create a

contract capable of binding the offeree as well.
Beehive acknowledges that the part performance clause of the
Statute of

Frauds as

Annotated (1987)

is limited

is, in fact performed.
create

an

set forth

acceptance

in Section

to that portion of a contract which

However,
of

70A-2-201 Utah Code

an

partial

offer

performance

can also

under Section 70A-2-206 as

indicated by the official comments set forth above.

ARGUMENT II
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST
WHICH SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED THE
GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE OF BEEHIVE'S
DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH ROBINSON
In

its

opening

distributorship agreements

brief,
for the
7

Robinson

indicates

that

sale of goods is governed by

Article 2

of Utah's

Uniform Commercial

Code, and that in order

for a memorandum to be binding, it must indicate that
for

sale

"has

been

made"

as

indicated

(Respondent's Brief at

page

15).

arguments

with

these

and

agrees

Beehive

the existence of a

acknowledges these

July 22, 1985 and the

serve as sufficient memoranda to support

distributorship.

Beehive's contention

Robinson's brief

principles of law. However,

Beehive has repeatedly contended that the
April 17, 1986 letters

in

a contract

Robinson does

not dispute

that some type of distributorship agreement

had been made (Respondent's Brief at page 16). The only question
that remains, therefore, is what the terms and conditions of that
agreement

or

agreements

distributorship
agreements:
for a

were.

arrangement

One for

Robinson

was,

a temporary

permanent distributorship.

in

argues

effect,

two

distributorship and

the parties.

the

separate
the other

Robinson further contends that

while they did enter into the temporary distributorship
permanent distributorship

that

arrangement was

that the

never entered into by

This contention ignores certain evidence

which was

presented by Beehive in their Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment (Record at 64).
and Disputed

In

Beehive's Statement

of Additional

Facts, it states that the temporary distributorship

was to be converted to a permanent distributorship if Beehive was
able to outperform its competitor, Interstate Brick, and as such,
disputes the "two contract" theory of Robinson.
this claim

Beehive supports

by referring to the Deposition of Randall Browning at

page 75, where we find the following dialogue:
8

Q:

What

did

Dee

Young

tell you, if anything, about the

terms under which you

would be

able to

sell Robinson

Brick products?
A.

I was

told that

we were

going to be able to sell the

brick, Robinson Products,

That Interstate was going to

be able to sell the brick and that we were more or less
in a horse race
would end

to see

up with

who sold

the most

the exclusive

to see who

distributorship.

It

was our understanding Robinson's policy was not to have
a

split

distributorship

distributor, so we went
could, promotion

but

to

to work

wise, to

have

one exclusive

and just

did what we

promote the brick and to do

the best job we could.
(Record 96, at page 75.)
Continued on

in

this

deposition, we

find

the following

dialogue:
Q.

As of

the Spring of 1985, you knew that you were being

granted a temporary distributorship; is that correct?
A.

I don't know that

we considered

it temporary

at that

time.
Q.

Well you knew that at some point down the road Robinson
Brick was going to appoint an exclusive distributor.

A.

And

we

were

given

the

understanding

that

if we

outperformed our competition that the distributor would
be us.

9

Q.

But you

are also aware it was possible it would not be

you.
A.

If we did not outperform them sales wise, that would be
correct.

Q.

You knew

it may

be somebody besides yourself; is that

right?
A.

Based on performance, that's correct.

(Record 96 at pages 75-76.)
This testimony clearly supports Beehive's contention
single

distributorship

terminated

only

Interstate

if

was

contemplated

Beehive

Brick.

failed

Although

that

that it would be
more

goods than

contends

agreements,

if

that

we

the

view the

a light most favorable to Beehive, it must be concluded

the

distributorship

agreements

but

was

arrangement

one

agreement

conditions of performance.
erred by

sell

Robinson

distributorships were two separate
facts in

to

and

that a

either failing

As

to view

most favorable to Beehive or, in

a

was

not

subject
result,

two

only

the

the disputed

to

separate
certain

District Court
facts in a light

the alternative,

in failing to

correctly apply the law to these facts.
ARGUMENT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ROBINSON DID NOT INTERFERE WITH BEEHIVE'S
ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS CONTRACTS
In

its

opening

brief, Beehive argued that representatives

from Interstate Brick Company, acting as agents for Robinson,

10

contacted Emerson
brick

order

Beehive.

Larkin in

previously

It is

an attempt

submitted

undisputed by

to fill the one million

by

Emerson

Larkin

Robinson that Emerson Larkin had

placed an order with Beehive for one million brick.
this

fact,

however,

Robinson

continues

contention was not supported by the
court

to

Judgment

its

Memorandum

in

Opposition

it

contended

representatives

of

Robinson

in

an

(Record

at

64).

position

by

order

referring

(Record 96 at 118).
Browning

testified

Brick, had in fact
attempt to
Brick.
not

to

that

the

noted in

that

Emerson

persuade Mr.

Robinson

any
and

personal
Interstate

responsible for

claim

that

this

to Motion for Summary

clients

were

attempt

contacted by

to

fill

Beehive

the one

supported its

of Randall Browning

Beehive's opening

brief, Mr.

Larkin, a customer of Beehive

contacted

by

Interstate

Brick

in an

Larkin to cancel his order with Beehive

Robinson seems to argue

have

In spite of

Beehive refers the

Deposition

As

been

to

record.

where

million brick

through

that because

knowledge
Brick

of

that

Randy Browning did

communications

Robinson

would

the activities of its new distributor.

this argument was not raised in

the Motion

between
not

be

However,

for Summary Judgment

and, as such, is not appropriate for this appeal.
Furthermore,

Robinson

does

contacted Emerson Larkin in
brick

order.

Certainly

acts of its agents
certainly

would

an attempt

deny

that

to complete

Interstate
the million

Robinson would be responsible for the

and that

constitute

not

the activities
an
11

attempt

to

of Interstate Brick
interfere with the

contractual relationship
Beehive Brick.
some question

that existed between Emerson Larkin and

Accordingly, it appears

that there

was at least

as to whether or not Robinson would be responsible

for the attempted interference with the

contractual relationship

between Beehive and Emerson Larkin, and that the court improperly
granted summary judgment as to this issue.

ARGUMENT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
BEEHIVE HAD NOT PROVIDED GOODS
AND SERVICES TO DEFENDANT
In
provided

Beehive's
goods

opening
and

brief,

services

it

to

is

argued

Robinson

by

dealership agreement for approximately one year.
a

distributorship,

Beehive

maintained

Robinson's products and thereby
recognizes that

the record

a

conferred

is somewhat

that Beehive
maintaining

In so acting as

market
a

a

position for

benefit.

Beehive

sparse as to the nature

and scope of these benefits; however, it should be noted that the
record

is

equally

sparse

as to statements which would support

Robinson's contention that no

goods and

Accordingly, the

erred in granting summary judgment

trial court

services were provided.

when the record did not support this conclusion.

ARGUMENT V
ROBINSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
BEEHIVE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In its
incurred in

opening

brief,

responding to

Robinson

requests

this appeal.
12

attorney's fees

Specifically, Robinson

suggests that Beehive's appeal is frivolous, having no reasonable
legal or factual basis*
good

faith

in

Beehive

submitting

contends that

this

appeal

should not be awarded attorney's fees.

it has

acted in

and, as such, Robinson

To

the contrary, Beehive

contends that it should be awarded costs and attorney's fees as a
result

of

Robinson's

contention regarding

failure

to

questions of

address
fact which

Beehive's

primary

exist relative to

Beehive's First Cause of Action.

CONCLUSION
The District Court incorrectly granted Robinson's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The

reversed and a trial
Complaint.

Beehive

judgment of the District Court should be

awarded on
should

the issues

raised in Beehive's

be awarded costs and/or attorney's

fees incurred in presenting this appeal.
DATED this

//

day of April, 1988.

/f/
STAHfORD NIELSON
Attorney for Appellant
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 278-7755
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to

be

day of April, 1988, to the following:
Allan L. Sullivan
Kathryn H. Snedaker
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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ADDENDUM
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UTAH CODE

WIW

Third District Local Rules

RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF
UTAH
The following local rules of the Third Judicial
District Court modify and supplement the Rules of
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of
the State of Utah promulgated on June 30, 1983,
and rescind the local rules of the Third Judicial
District Court effective April 1, 1984 These rules
ire effective as of June 1,1987
tak 1 AHtgaaeat of cites la Silt Lake Coaaty
Rak 1 Ajrigaaeat of cam la Toook aad Saamh
Coaatfet
gait 3 Law mi B O O M fair l i a r
l i k 4 Lfcaitadoe oa discovery tad aiocftoas
Rak 5 Wrfttca oflfttn, Jo4gja*ats aaa* tVcrect.
Rak a Pretrial cafeoiar
Rak 7 Motioaa fat aapaJttatfttaJ acacaedisgt
gak I Doajctfk Rctatiooj C f i a a l a a j f r
Rak 9 MoolrVatftoa* of 4rt ore* Becree*
Rak I t Probate
Rak 11 A*oatJoat
Rak 12 Coottoaaocoi la eaaai larohrtag aUaort
Rak 13 Maboa* la caaeaMaaic
Rak 14 Rdalcd caact aa—Hag la JaveoJk Coart
Rak IS Certfflcatftoa af Dfctfrkt Coorl Caact to Javeatk
Coart

Rale 3 Law aod asotloa caleadar
Rules 2 7 and 2 8 of the Rules of Practice in the
District Courts of the State of Utah shall not apply
to motions filed in the Third Judicial District Court
(a) All law and motion matters will be heard by
the judge assigned to the case These matters will be
set on a regular law and motion calendar as arranged with the clerk of the judge assigned to the
case Ex parte matters based upon stipulation will be
presented only to the judge assigned to the case
(b) Counsel shall contact the court and receive a
date for hearing on the regular law and motion
calendar, or may file a written request that the
matter be resolved without hearing based upon the
briefs submitted
(c) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring written notice will be heard only after written
notice, which shall be served not less than five (5)
days prior to the date specified in the notice for
hearing, unless the court for good cause shown shall
by order shorten the time for notice of hearing

(d) Motions based upon depositions or supported
thereby shall not be heard unless the depositions are
filed in the clerk's office at least forty-eight (48)
hours before the hearing on the said motion
(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be received, except on stipulation of the parties or for
good cause shown Courtesy copies of all affidavits
shall be given to the judge within the time limits
required by the Utah Rules of C m ) Procedure, and
shall indicate the date upon which the matter is set
for hearing Such copy shall be clearly marked as a
courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the clerk
of the court
Rule 1 Aastf aaseat of cases la Salt Lake Coaaty.
( 0 AH motions except uncontested or ex parte
(a) All civil, criminal and domestic relations cases
matters may be accompanied by a brief statement of
filed in Salt Lake County shall be assigned on a
points and authorities, and any affidavits relied
random basts at the time of filing to an individual
upon in support thereof Points and authorities
judge who will hear all matters in the assigned case
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed
(b) Name of judge on pleading* Any pleading
five (5) pages in length, exclusive of the statement of
filed in a criminal or civil case after the case has
material facts as hereinafter provided, except as
been assigned to a judge must have the name of the
waived by order of the court on ex parte applica
judge who has been assigned to the case on the face
tion
of the pleading below the number of the case
(g) The points and authorities in support of a
(c) Ex parte and emergency matters When the
dispositive motion shall begin with a section that
judge assigned to a case is unavailable to consider ex
contains a concise statement of material facts as to
parte and emergency matters for a period exceeding H which the movant contends no genuine issue exists
one work day the absent judge's clerk will inform
The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sencounsel of a judge authorized to handle such
tences, and shall refer with particularity to those
matters Other judges will not consider proposed
portions of the record upon which the movant
orders on cases not assigned to them, except upon a
relies
showing of exceptional circumstances which in the
(h) The points and authorities in opposition to a
interest of justice require immediate action
dispositive motion shall begin with a section that
(d) Spouse Abuse Act orders Stipulated or
contains a concise statement of material facts as to
default orders pursuant to the Spouse Abuse Act
which the party contends a genuine issue exists
which are a result of a hearing before the Domestic
Each fact in dispute shall be stated in separate
Relations Commissioner may be presented to any
numbered sentences, and shall refer with particulajudge for signature
rity to those portions of the record upon which the
Rule 2 AstrgBBaeat of cases la Tooek aad Sasasalt
Coaaties
(a) A judge will be assigned for six month terms
to Tooele and Summit Counties, during which time
he or she will hear all matters in those counties,
except cases individually assigned, as provided in
part (b) of this rule At the end of the six month
term, the newly assigned judge will assume all
ongoing matters in those counties
(b) Upon motion of either party, the presiding
judge may assign cases of unusual complexity to an
individual judge who will hear all matters on the
assigned case
»°?*£.°

opposing party relies and, if applicable, shall state
the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's
facts that are disputed All material facts set forth
in the statement of the movant shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment,
unless specifically controverted by the statement of
the opposing party
0) If a memorandum of points and authorities is
filed in support of a motion it must be served on the
opposing party or his counsel and filed with the
court no later than ten (10) days before the date set
for heanng If a responsive memorandum is filed it
shall be served upon the opposing party or counsel
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Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Section 4, Uniform Sales
Act (which was based on Section
17 of the Statute of 29 Charles
II).
Changes:
Completely
rephrased; restricted to sale of
goods. See also Sections 1—206,
8—319 and 9—203.
Purposes of Changes: The
changed phraseology of this section is intended to make it clear
that:
1. The required writing need
not contain all the material terms
of the contract and such material
terms as are stated need not be
precisely stated. All that is required is that the writing afford
a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a
real transaction. It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch
pad. It need not indicate which
party is the buyer and which the
seller. The only term which must
appear is the quantity term
which need not be accurately
stated but recovery is limited to
the amount stated. The price,
time and place of payment or delivery, the general quality of the
goods, or any particular warranties may all be omitted.
Special emphasis must be
placed on the permissibility of
omitting the price term in view of
the insistence of some courts on
the express inclusion of this term

even where the parties have contracted on the basis of a published price list. In many valid contracts for sale the parties do not
mention the price in express 1 2 - 2 0 1
terms, the buyer being bound to U. C. C.
pay and the seller to accept a reasonable price which the trier of
the fact may well be trusted to
determine.
Again, frequently
the price is not mentioned since
the parties have based their
agreement on a price list or catalogue known to both of them and
this list serves as an efficient
safeguard against perjury. Finally, "market" prices and valuations that are current in the
vicinity constitute a similar
check. Thus if the price is not
stated in the memorandum it can
normally be supplied without
danger of fraud. Of course if
the "price" consists of goods
rather than money the quantity
of goods must be stated.
Only three definite and invariable requirements as to the memorandum are made by this subsection. First, it must evidence a
contract for the sale of goods;

second, it must be "signed", a
word which includes any authentication which identifies the party to be charged; and thirdr St

must specify a quantity*
2. "Partial performance" as a
substitute for the required memorandum can validate the contract
only for the goods which have
been accepted or for which pay-

Official Comment
tual shipment or by a prompt
promise to ship and rejects the
artificial theory that only a
single mode of acceptance is
normally envisaged by an offer.
This is true even though the Ianguage of the offer happens to be
"ship at once" or the like.
"Shipment" is here used in the
same sense as in Section 2—504;
it does not include the beginning
of delivery by the seller's own
truck or by messenger. But
loading on the seller's own truck
might be a beginning of performance under subsection (2).

Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Sections 1 and 3, Uniform
Sales Act.
Changes: Completely rewritten
in this and other sections of this
Article.
Purposes of Changes: To make
it clear that:
!• Any reasonable manner of
acceptance ia-intended .to-be regarded aaayailabkunteafi the offeror has made quite clear that
it_wilLMt J&_ &e_£e£tab)e. Former technical rules as to acceptance, such as requiring that telegraphic offers be accepted by telegraphed acceptance, etc., are rejected and a criterion that the
acceptance be "in any manner
and by any medium reasonable
under the circumstances," is substituted. This section is intended to remain flexible and its applicability to be enlarged as new
media of communication develop
or as the more time-saving present day media come into general
use.
2. Either shipment or a
prompt promise to ship is made a
proper means of acceptance of
an offer looking to current shipment. In accordance with ordinary commercial understanding
the section interprets an order
looking to current shipment as
allowing acceptance either by ac-

3. The beginning of performance by an offeree can be effective as acceptance so as to bind
the offeror only if followed within a reasonable time by notice
to the offeror. Such a beginning
of performance must unambiguously express the offeree's intention to engage himself. For the
protection of both parties it is
essential that notice follow in
due course to constitute acceptance. Nothing in this section
however bars the possibility that
under the common law performance begun may have an intermediate effect of temporarily
barring revocation of the offer,
or at the offeror's option, final
effect in constituting acceptance.
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April 17, 1986

Mr. Randy Browning
Beehive Brick
244 South 500 West
Salt Lake pity, UT

84101

Dear Randy:
Thank you for the very cordial meeting we had on Tuesday.
I'm disappointed that the distributor relationship must be
broken entirely at this time.
I think that it is important to put down in waiting what we
discussed as far as clearing out existing orders.
1.

All existing orders must be picked up on or before
May 16, 1986.
(After this date, all existing orders
will be cancelled.)

2.

No new orders are to be accepted by Robinson Brick Co.

3.

Existing orders may not be increased.

4.

The existing credit limitations, as established by
Harris of Robinson Brick Company, remain in effect.

5.

The existing order of 1,000,000 Provincial Antique
(special color) for Emerson Larkin cannot be produced.
We will allow substitutions with the following: Dover
Gray,
Heritage
Antique,
Provincial
Antique
and
Provincial Antique Special Lot.

Jim

The following is a current list of open orders we are
willing to fill, provided inventory is available:
ROBCO •

BRICK NAME

REMAINING
ON ORDER

26917
19165
27092
31030
27006
26919

Buckwheat
Dover Gray KS
Mission Autumn Gold
Rustic Buff Sp. Lot.
Colonial Grain
Provincial Antique

2,000
1,938
18,000
500
100
16,000

P.O. Box 5243 • 1845 West Dartmouth • Denver, Colorado 80217-5243 • (303) 781-9002

Mr. Randy Browning
Beehive Brick
April 17, 1986
Page 2

ROBCO •

BRICK NAME

REMAINING
ON ORDER

26446
31450
31448
26446
26446
23525
28466

Provincial Antique
Stoneybrook
Provincial Antique
Mis. Aut. Gold-C/B
Mission Aut. Gold
Provincial Antique
Heritage Antique

20,000
9,500
15,000
25,000
17,000
11,000
1,500

Emerson Larkin Order
040496

Provincial Antique
1,000,000
(Dover Gray, Prov. Antiq., Hert. Antiq.)

Sincerely,
ROBINSON BRICK COMPANY

OY[QnA
Monte S. Jones, Manager
Distributor Sales Division
MSJ:SAL

